



MEMORANDUM FOR:

 Executive Development Staff/OTE

FROM: Executive Assistant to the DDCI


Any suggestions on if this merits an answer
and if so, from whom?

Att: ER 84-2460/1

cc: D/PA w/att

Date 27 June 1984

FORM 101 USE PREVIOUS
5-75 EDITIONS

STAT

STAT

STAT

Suspended
5 July



UNIVERSITY OF SOUTH CAROLINA
COLUMBIA, S. C. 29208

DEPARTMENT OF GOVERNMENT
AND INTERNATIONAL STUDIES

Executive Registry
84-2460/1

June 18, 1984

Mr. John N. McMahon
Central Intelligence Agency
Washington, D.C. 20505

Dear Mr. McMahon:

In our most useful meeting of June 11-13 with CIA 'principals' I was struck by the emphasis given to "the end use of intelligence," and the problem of "intelligence affecting policy." There was a particularly striking omission in this discussion which suggests there may be some misdirection of effort. Not once was the concept or the enterprise of strategy mentioned. I have the feeling there may be more than a semantic problem here.

- "Policy represents interests" (Clausewitz) in terms of objectives - goals. The definition of interests (the translation of interests into policy) is inherently a 'political' enterprise done by political leadership. Policy will tell us rather more about ourselves than about the outside world. Policy will not be much affected by (leveraged by) intelligence of that outside world.
- Strategy supports interests - advances policy. Strategy consists of those choices by which we undertake to realize objectives. Strategy encompasses the support-realm for policy - or should.
- Intelligence is integral to strategy; one might go so far as to say it must be controlling here. The intelligence enterprise must set out to impact strategy (strategic choices) heavily. Policy is not the principal target for intelligence; it is foolish - a waste of time - to try to make it so.
- Ergo: it will be fundamental to the intelligence enterprise to distinguish the realms of policy and strategy (ends and means) and to be attuned to the span of plausible strategic choices in any given instance (Central America, Strategic Arms, etc). Stop fighting the 'policy' problems; address the 'strategy' problem where you can make a difference.




Mr. John N. McMahon
June 18, 1984
page 2

This is what happens when you invite professors in! What I have outlined here may be precisely the course you follow. However, the fact remains - not once was strategy mentioned. Incidentally, the South African 'community' with which I interact has gone to great pains to sort all this out.

Best wishes in your new endeavors.

Sincerely,



Professor

STAT

JMR/bma